Toyota anuncia retiro global del Prius y otros híbridos
Redacción
BBC Mundo
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La empresa automotriz Toyota anunció este martes el retiro de 436.000 autos híbridos, principalmente del modelo Prius, debido a una falla en su sistema de frenos.
La noticia se dio a conocer pocas horas después del retiro de esos modelos del mercado japonés. La medida afecta a casi 200.000 Prius vendidos en el archipiélago.
En lo que va de año la compañía ya ha tenido que retirar millones de vehículos debido a problemas en el acelerador y la alfombrilla.
clic Lea: Accionistas de EE.UU. demandan a Toyota
El presidente de Toyota, Akio Toyoda, quien ya tiene que tratar con el daño causado a la imagen de la marca por otros problemas técnicos, explicó que los detalles del plan para sacar del mercado estos nuevos cientos de miles de autos serán anunciados a última hora de este martes.
"Hemos decidido retirarlos porque creemos que la seguridad de nuestros clientes es nuestra prioridad", dijo Toyoda en rueda de prensa.
El Prius fue el auto más vendido en Japón en 2009 y es el modelo híbrido más popular en todo el mundo.
En el software
Toyota ha venido sufriendo repetidas controversias por problemas en varios de sus modelos.
Hasta la fecha ha habido unos 200 reclamos en Japón y Estados Unidos sobre el sistema de frenos del Prius que no se activan en ciertas condiciones una vez se presiona el pedal.
Se cree que esto afecta a unos 270.000 Prius vendidos en Estados Unidos y Japón desde mayo pasado.
Toyota culpa de los problemas a un fallo en un software de frenado y asegura que ya se ha arreglado en los vehículos de este año.
El fabricante de autos también anunció que suspenderá las ventas de los modelos híbridos Sai (de venta exclusiva en Japón) y Lexus HS250h (vendido globalmente) al tiempo que ordenó el retiro de los que ya están circulando. Las razones también tienen que ver con los frenos.
clic Lea: Toyota admite falla en frenos del Prius
Línea abierta
retiros de toyota
Septiembre 2007, EE.UU.: 55.000 Camry y Lexus por alfombrado
Octubre 2009, EE.UU.: 3,8 millones de autos Toyota y Lexus debido a problemas en el alfombrado
Noviembre 2009, EE.UU.: la cifra de vehículos retirados por alfombrado aumenta a 4,2 millones
Enero 2010, EE. UU.: 2,3 millones de autos Toyota se retiran por problemas en el pedal del acelerador (de esos, 2,1 millones ya estaban entre los que tenían fallas en el alfombrado)
Enero 2010, EE.UU.: 1,1 millones de Toyota se retiran por el alfombrado
Febrero 2010, Europa: 1,8 millones de Toyota salen del mercado por fallas en el pedal
Febrero 2010, Japón y EE.UU.: 200 quejas de fallas en el sistema de frenos del nuevo Prius. Nuevo retiro de autos.
El Departamento de Transporte de Estados Unidos anunció la semana pasada que estaba investigando el problema de frenos del Prius, debido a que el gobierno había recibido 124 informes de conductores sobre el tema, que incluía cuatro accidentes.
La investigación estadounidense mirará las alegaciones sobre la pérdida momentánea del sistema de frenos cuando se viaja por superficies desiguales.
El presidente de la empresa escribió hace poco al diario estadounidense Washington Post que estaba en contacto con la Secretaria de Transporte de ese país, Ray LaHood, a quien le aseguró que la comunicación se mantendrá abierta, será más frecuenta y que Toyota estará "más atenta en responder" a las autoridades.
Hasta ahora Toyota ha tenido que retirar ocho millones de vehículos de otros modelos por problemas en el acelerador o en las alfombrillas.
Según el corresponsal de la BBC en la ciudad japonesa de Toyota, Alastair Leithead, la empresa ha sido golpeada duramente en todo el mundo. El impacto en sus finanzas podría durar meses o inclusive años.
Antes del anuncio del retiro del Prius en Japón, Toyota estimaba que las pérdidas alcanzarían los US$2.000 millones. Se espera que la salida del híbrido aumente la cifra.
clic Lea también: Imagen de Toyota en "trizas"
Honda también anuncia retiro de autos
Redacción
BBC Mundo
Honda anunció que también está retirando cientos de miles de autos en Estados Unidos debido a posibles desperfectos.
En un nuevo golpe para la industria automotriz japonesa, la firma Honda confirmó que está expandiendo una orden anterior de retiro de autos con problemas en sus bolsas de aire, para incluir a más de 400.000 unidades adicionales, la mayoría de ellas en Estados Unidos.
La medida, que empezó en 2008 con el retiro de 4.000 vehículos, y continuó con otros 510.000 unidades en 2009, se extiende ahora a 437.000 autos adicionales, incluyendo cerca de 59.000 unidades vendidas en México, Canadá, Japón, Taiwán y Australia.
La noticia llega menos de 24 horas después de que el mayor fabricante de autos del mundo, Toyota, pidiera otro retiro masivo de vehículos para arreglar problemas con el sistema de frenos de sus vehículos híbrido, en especial el modelo Prius.
clic Lea: Toyota ordena retirar el Prius
El retiro incluye a los populares modelos Accord, Civic Odissey, Pilot, CL y CR-V de 2001 y 2002, así como al modelo Acura TL de 2002.
"No podemos estar completamente seguros de que el inflador de la bolsa de aire del conductor en los vehículos llamados a revisión funcionará como fue diseñado", dijo el comunicado de Honda.
Demasiada presión
La empresa dice que, en algunos de los carros, el sistema de inflado de las bolsas de aire puede activarse con demasiada presión.
Honda identificó doce incidentes en los que la bolsa de aire se infló excesivamente y estalló, arrojando pequeños fragmentos de metal, informa el corresponsal de la BBC en Washington, Steve Kingstone.
clic Lea también: Todos contra Toyota
En uno de los casos, el desperfecto resultó en una muerte.
Los ingenieros de Honda han buscado resolver el problema, pero en un comunicado, la empresa admite que no puede estar totalmente segura de que las bolsas de aire "funcionen de acuerdo a como fueron diseñadas", añadió el corresponsal.
En su nueva versión, la orden de retiro cubre a 9.000 vehículos en México, 1.300 en Taiwan y 700 en Australia, así como 4.000 en Japón.
Redacción
BBC Mundo
Honda anunció que también está retirando cientos de miles de autos en Estados Unidos debido a posibles desperfectos.
En un nuevo golpe para la industria automotriz japonesa, la firma Honda confirmó que está expandiendo una orden anterior de retiro de autos con problemas en sus bolsas de aire, para incluir a más de 400.000 unidades adicionales, la mayoría de ellas en Estados Unidos.
La medida, que empezó en 2008 con el retiro de 4.000 vehículos, y continuó con otros 510.000 unidades en 2009, se extiende ahora a 437.000 autos adicionales, incluyendo cerca de 59.000 unidades vendidas en México, Canadá, Japón, Taiwán y Australia.
La noticia llega menos de 24 horas después de que el mayor fabricante de autos del mundo, Toyota, pidiera otro retiro masivo de vehículos para arreglar problemas con el sistema de frenos de sus vehículos híbrido, en especial el modelo Prius.
clic Lea: Toyota ordena retirar el Prius
El retiro incluye a los populares modelos Accord, Civic Odissey, Pilot, CL y CR-V de 2001 y 2002, así como al modelo Acura TL de 2002.
"No podemos estar completamente seguros de que el inflador de la bolsa de aire del conductor en los vehículos llamados a revisión funcionará como fue diseñado", dijo el comunicado de Honda.
Demasiada presión
La empresa dice que, en algunos de los carros, el sistema de inflado de las bolsas de aire puede activarse con demasiada presión.
Honda identificó doce incidentes en los que la bolsa de aire se infló excesivamente y estalló, arrojando pequeños fragmentos de metal, informa el corresponsal de la BBC en Washington, Steve Kingstone.
clic Lea también: Todos contra Toyota
En uno de los casos, el desperfecto resultó en una muerte.
Los ingenieros de Honda han buscado resolver el problema, pero en un comunicado, la empresa admite que no puede estar totalmente segura de que las bolsas de aire "funcionen de acuerdo a como fueron diseñadas", añadió el corresponsal.
En su nueva versión, la orden de retiro cubre a 9.000 vehículos en México, 1.300 en Taiwan y 700 en Australia, así como 4.000 en Japón.
Toyota, ¿cómo rehacer una imagen dañada?
Redacción
BBC Mundo
Toyota llamó a revisión millones de autos en todo el mundo.
Los gobiernos, medios de comunicación y, más importante, los consumidores han puesto en tela de juicio la reputación de Toyota, luego de que la empresa automotriz japonesa llamara a revisión millones de autos en todo el mundo.
Diversas empresas a lo largo de la historia sufrieron duros golpes a su reputación. Y, en mayor o menor medida, volvieron a dar pelea.
La pregunta que surge es cómo hará el mayor fabricante de vehículos del mundo para recuperar su buena imagen.
Una imagen que fue construida durante décadas en base, principalmente, a la calidad, eficiencia y confiabilidad de sus productos.
Una imagen que puede tardar días en derrumbarse y, advierten analistas, podría llevar años –o incluso décadas– en volver a erigir.
clic Lea: ¿Qué hacer si su Toyota fue afectado?
La experiencia de Toyota
"El daño a la reputación ya está hecho. Ahora no se trata del mensaje. Se trata de cientos de vendedores y millones de consumidores
Jeff Hess, profesor de marketing en la Universidad Politécnica Estatal de California
Los llamados a revisión no son anormales en la industria automotriz. De hecho, Toyota ya lo tuvo que hacer en 1989 cuando lanzó su marca de lujo Lexus.
En aquel momento, Lexus se vio afectado por una serie de fallas. Toyota no dudó y suspendió la producción.
La compañía envió empleados a recoger cada uno de los 8.000 autos involucrados. Le dieron un vehículo a los usuarios hasta que la reparación estuviera lista y luego devolvieron el auto reparado, recién lavado y con el tanque de combustible lleno.
Ahora los especialistas en torno al manejo de crisis aseguran que la compañía japonesa debe actuar con honestidad y apertura.
Como recuerda el corresponsal de BBC Mundo en Washington, Carlos Chirinos, ya en 2008 Toyota invirtió US$4 millones para labores de cabildeo.
En la actual crisis la firma contrató a abogados y a expertos en relaciones públicas, y en los canales de televisión estadounidenses ya aparece una campaña para recuperar la buena reputación de la compañía.
Pero puede que ello sólo no sea suficiente.
Toyota estimó en US$2.000 millones el costo del llamado a revisión.
"El daño a la reputación ya está hecho. Ahora no se trata del mensaje. Se trata de cientos de vendedores y millones de consumidores", aseguró a la agencia Reuters Jeff Hess, profesor de marketing en la Universidad Politécnica Estatal de California y ex analista de la industria automotriz.
Mark Rechtin, uno de los editores de Automotive News, le dijo al programa World Today de la BBC que el público estadounidense no suele prestar demasiada atención a las revisiones de vehículos, pero que la reacción esta vez es más extrema.
"Lo que estamos viendo es un poco de una fiebre de revisión. Pienso que los consumidores han pasivamente ignorado las revisiones en Detroit por años, casi al punto de estar esperándolas", explicó.
"Pero uno empieza a escuchar cosas como trampas de muerte de Toyota (…) es un cambio de paradigma… es un fervor, casi un pánico", indicó Rechtin.
clic Lea: Honda también anuncia retiro de autos
El público, acostumbrado
Según el especialista, el público ya está acostumbrado a ciertos llamados a revisión.
Lo que estamos viendo es un poco de una fiebre de revisión. Pienso que los consumidores han pasivamente ignorado las revisiones en Detroit por años, casi al punto de estar esperándolas
Mark Rechtin, editor de Automotive News
Ford, la firma estadounidense, vio cómo su imagen salía perjudicada tras vuelcos que involucraron a su camioneta Ford Explorer en 2000.
Y sin ir más lejos, el año pasado la compañía llamó a revisión unos 4,5 millones de vehículos por un fallo en un interruptor defectuoso.
En tanto, la automotriz alemana Audi realizó en la década de los '80 una masiva llamada a revisión en EE.UU luego de que un fallo en el acelerador fuera relacionado con seis muertos y 700 accidentes.
Las ventas de Audi cayeron en EE.UU. un 83% entre 1985 y 1991.
La lección de Tylenol
Toyota es el mayor fabricante de autos del mundo.
Fuera del rubro automotriz, otras empresas también han sufrido duros golpes a su imagen.
Un caso que cobró relevancia en su momento fue el de Perrier, la distinguida compañía francesa de agua mineral embotellada.
En 1990 un laboratorio de Carolina del Norte encontró benceno, un químico utilizado en gasolinas, en algunas botellas.
Alrededor de 160 millones de botellas debieron ser retiradas del mercado.
En la industria farmacéutica el caso de Johnson & Johnson será recordado. En 1982, siete personas murieron en EE.UU. tras consumir cápsulas contaminadas con cianuro del producto Tylenol, pensado para aliviar dolores y bajar la fiebre.
La reacción fue inmediata y la retirada, total: 31 millones de frascos. Las pérdidas pasaron los US$100 millones.
Pero la marca aún sigue entre las más vendidas. Eso ocurrió, aseguran los expertos, debido a la rápida y efectiva respuesta de la compañía.
Redacción
BBC Mundo
Toyota llamó a revisión millones de autos en todo el mundo.
Los gobiernos, medios de comunicación y, más importante, los consumidores han puesto en tela de juicio la reputación de Toyota, luego de que la empresa automotriz japonesa llamara a revisión millones de autos en todo el mundo.
Diversas empresas a lo largo de la historia sufrieron duros golpes a su reputación. Y, en mayor o menor medida, volvieron a dar pelea.
La pregunta que surge es cómo hará el mayor fabricante de vehículos del mundo para recuperar su buena imagen.
Una imagen que fue construida durante décadas en base, principalmente, a la calidad, eficiencia y confiabilidad de sus productos.
Una imagen que puede tardar días en derrumbarse y, advierten analistas, podría llevar años –o incluso décadas– en volver a erigir.
clic Lea: ¿Qué hacer si su Toyota fue afectado?
La experiencia de Toyota
"El daño a la reputación ya está hecho. Ahora no se trata del mensaje. Se trata de cientos de vendedores y millones de consumidores
Jeff Hess, profesor de marketing en la Universidad Politécnica Estatal de California
Los llamados a revisión no son anormales en la industria automotriz. De hecho, Toyota ya lo tuvo que hacer en 1989 cuando lanzó su marca de lujo Lexus.
En aquel momento, Lexus se vio afectado por una serie de fallas. Toyota no dudó y suspendió la producción.
La compañía envió empleados a recoger cada uno de los 8.000 autos involucrados. Le dieron un vehículo a los usuarios hasta que la reparación estuviera lista y luego devolvieron el auto reparado, recién lavado y con el tanque de combustible lleno.
Ahora los especialistas en torno al manejo de crisis aseguran que la compañía japonesa debe actuar con honestidad y apertura.
Como recuerda el corresponsal de BBC Mundo en Washington, Carlos Chirinos, ya en 2008 Toyota invirtió US$4 millones para labores de cabildeo.
En la actual crisis la firma contrató a abogados y a expertos en relaciones públicas, y en los canales de televisión estadounidenses ya aparece una campaña para recuperar la buena reputación de la compañía.
Pero puede que ello sólo no sea suficiente.
Toyota estimó en US$2.000 millones el costo del llamado a revisión.
"El daño a la reputación ya está hecho. Ahora no se trata del mensaje. Se trata de cientos de vendedores y millones de consumidores", aseguró a la agencia Reuters Jeff Hess, profesor de marketing en la Universidad Politécnica Estatal de California y ex analista de la industria automotriz.
Mark Rechtin, uno de los editores de Automotive News, le dijo al programa World Today de la BBC que el público estadounidense no suele prestar demasiada atención a las revisiones de vehículos, pero que la reacción esta vez es más extrema.
"Lo que estamos viendo es un poco de una fiebre de revisión. Pienso que los consumidores han pasivamente ignorado las revisiones en Detroit por años, casi al punto de estar esperándolas", explicó.
"Pero uno empieza a escuchar cosas como trampas de muerte de Toyota (…) es un cambio de paradigma… es un fervor, casi un pánico", indicó Rechtin.
clic Lea: Honda también anuncia retiro de autos
El público, acostumbrado
Según el especialista, el público ya está acostumbrado a ciertos llamados a revisión.
Lo que estamos viendo es un poco de una fiebre de revisión. Pienso que los consumidores han pasivamente ignorado las revisiones en Detroit por años, casi al punto de estar esperándolas
Mark Rechtin, editor de Automotive News
Ford, la firma estadounidense, vio cómo su imagen salía perjudicada tras vuelcos que involucraron a su camioneta Ford Explorer en 2000.
Y sin ir más lejos, el año pasado la compañía llamó a revisión unos 4,5 millones de vehículos por un fallo en un interruptor defectuoso.
En tanto, la automotriz alemana Audi realizó en la década de los '80 una masiva llamada a revisión en EE.UU luego de que un fallo en el acelerador fuera relacionado con seis muertos y 700 accidentes.
Las ventas de Audi cayeron en EE.UU. un 83% entre 1985 y 1991.
La lección de Tylenol
Toyota es el mayor fabricante de autos del mundo.
Fuera del rubro automotriz, otras empresas también han sufrido duros golpes a su imagen.
Un caso que cobró relevancia en su momento fue el de Perrier, la distinguida compañía francesa de agua mineral embotellada.
En 1990 un laboratorio de Carolina del Norte encontró benceno, un químico utilizado en gasolinas, en algunas botellas.
Alrededor de 160 millones de botellas debieron ser retiradas del mercado.
En la industria farmacéutica el caso de Johnson & Johnson será recordado. En 1982, siete personas murieron en EE.UU. tras consumir cápsulas contaminadas con cianuro del producto Tylenol, pensado para aliviar dolores y bajar la fiebre.
La reacción fue inmediata y la retirada, total: 31 millones de frascos. Las pérdidas pasaron los US$100 millones.
Pero la marca aún sigue entre las más vendidas. Eso ocurrió, aseguran los expertos, debido a la rápida y efectiva respuesta de la compañía.
At Toyota's Home Base, Townspeople Are Worried
By Michael Schuman / Toyota City Wednesday, Feb. 10, 2010
Toyota City, Japan
Kimimasa Mayama / Bloomberg / Getty
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For bespectacled Sirou Hirayama, times have never been so bad. He and his wife Kiyomi, standing behind the counter at the Toyomi pharmacy in downtown Toyota City, home to Japanese car giant Toyota Motor, complain that the global recession has so punished the local economy that his sales are down 20% from 18 months ago. Now, with Toyota facing a crisis over the safety of its cars, Hirayama fears more hard times down the road. "Toyota was known for quality cars. Now that's changed 180 degrees," he says. "I'm fearful of the impact. The whole area is dependent on Toyota."
That gloom is enveloping Toyota City. The town of 420,000 in eastern Japan has been synonymous with Japanese manufacturing prowess for decades. The residents were so proud of Toyota that in 1959 they changed the city's then name, Koromo, to match its most important citizen. But the town's fortunes rise and fall with Toyota's. The firm's sprawling factory complexes lie only a short distance from the town center, and, as in any company town, the paychecks of Toyota employees are the main source of support for its restaurants and shops. According to city statistics, 77,000 people in the town work in auto-related industries. The entire region is connected to Toyota, with independent suppliers of parts spread through the surrounding countryside and nearby cities. "Toyota is the biggest company in this area," says Masahiko Hosokawa, a business professor at Chubu University in Nagoya, the closest major metropolis to Toyota City. If Toyota's crisis depresses its global sales, "it will have an impact here," he says.
(See the 50 worst cars of all time.)
The timing is terrible. In recent months, Toyota City — which boasts Detroit as a sister city — has shared some of the pain felt by its American counterpart. The region is still suffering from what locals call the Toyota shock. After the Lehman bankruptcy, when the worst of the financial crisis bit and the U.S. car market collapsed, Toyota reduced production and shed temporary workers, sending a damaging ripple through the region. The scars are clearly visible on the town's streets, riddled with closed shops and restaurants. Ryuichi Watanabe, an agent at the local branch of the Able property brokerage, says rents are down some 20% from two years ago, with many apartments lying empty. He worries the worst may be yet to come. "The myth of Japanese quality has crumbled," he says. "That means less markets and a negative impact on the entire economy."
Toyota City already gives an impression of a town under siege. Toyota's giant headquarters building is inaccessible — like a fortress at war. A spokesman for the city wouldn't grant TIME an interview with officials, saying the government won't comment on the issues of one company. Toyota employees are keeping their lips tightly sealed as well. Those approached on the streets, their Toyota company IDs clearly visible, politely bow their heads and say they are unable to comment. Only one young employee, who wouldn't give his name, mutters, "We're not sure what is going to happen."
(See pictures of Detroit's decline.)
Yasuteru Kamiya has no doubt though. The proprietor of the Happy End café in Toyota City's center sees Toyota's current crisis as yet another stop in the town's 30-year decline. Toyota City, he says, has never regained the bustle it enjoyed back in the 1980s, during the go-go years when Japan was the rising force of the global economy. Since the Toyota shock, Kamiya's sales are down 50%. "We're very worried that we can't continue," he says. And that all depends on Toyota.
— With reporting by Terrence Terashima / Toyota City
By Michael Schuman / Toyota City Wednesday, Feb. 10, 2010
Toyota City, Japan
Kimimasa Mayama / Bloomberg / Getty
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Yahoo Buzz
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For bespectacled Sirou Hirayama, times have never been so bad. He and his wife Kiyomi, standing behind the counter at the Toyomi pharmacy in downtown Toyota City, home to Japanese car giant Toyota Motor, complain that the global recession has so punished the local economy that his sales are down 20% from 18 months ago. Now, with Toyota facing a crisis over the safety of its cars, Hirayama fears more hard times down the road. "Toyota was known for quality cars. Now that's changed 180 degrees," he says. "I'm fearful of the impact. The whole area is dependent on Toyota."
That gloom is enveloping Toyota City. The town of 420,000 in eastern Japan has been synonymous with Japanese manufacturing prowess for decades. The residents were so proud of Toyota that in 1959 they changed the city's then name, Koromo, to match its most important citizen. But the town's fortunes rise and fall with Toyota's. The firm's sprawling factory complexes lie only a short distance from the town center, and, as in any company town, the paychecks of Toyota employees are the main source of support for its restaurants and shops. According to city statistics, 77,000 people in the town work in auto-related industries. The entire region is connected to Toyota, with independent suppliers of parts spread through the surrounding countryside and nearby cities. "Toyota is the biggest company in this area," says Masahiko Hosokawa, a business professor at Chubu University in Nagoya, the closest major metropolis to Toyota City. If Toyota's crisis depresses its global sales, "it will have an impact here," he says.
(See the 50 worst cars of all time.)
The timing is terrible. In recent months, Toyota City — which boasts Detroit as a sister city — has shared some of the pain felt by its American counterpart. The region is still suffering from what locals call the Toyota shock. After the Lehman bankruptcy, when the worst of the financial crisis bit and the U.S. car market collapsed, Toyota reduced production and shed temporary workers, sending a damaging ripple through the region. The scars are clearly visible on the town's streets, riddled with closed shops and restaurants. Ryuichi Watanabe, an agent at the local branch of the Able property brokerage, says rents are down some 20% from two years ago, with many apartments lying empty. He worries the worst may be yet to come. "The myth of Japanese quality has crumbled," he says. "That means less markets and a negative impact on the entire economy."
Toyota City already gives an impression of a town under siege. Toyota's giant headquarters building is inaccessible — like a fortress at war. A spokesman for the city wouldn't grant TIME an interview with officials, saying the government won't comment on the issues of one company. Toyota employees are keeping their lips tightly sealed as well. Those approached on the streets, their Toyota company IDs clearly visible, politely bow their heads and say they are unable to comment. Only one young employee, who wouldn't give his name, mutters, "We're not sure what is going to happen."
(See pictures of Detroit's decline.)
Yasuteru Kamiya has no doubt though. The proprietor of the Happy End café in Toyota City's center sees Toyota's current crisis as yet another stop in the town's 30-year decline. Toyota City, he says, has never regained the bustle it enjoyed back in the 1980s, during the go-go years when Japan was the rising force of the global economy. Since the Toyota shock, Kamiya's sales are down 50%. "We're very worried that we can't continue," he says. And that all depends on Toyota.
— With reporting by Terrence Terashima / Toyota City
Ex-Toyota lawyer points to electronic throttle control
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By Chris Woodyard, USA TODAY
LOS ANGELES — A former in-house lawyer for Toyota alleged Wednesday that the automaker's unintended acceleration issues are caused by electronics snafus in cars, not just floor-mat jams and sticky gas pedals.
"It's the electronic throttle control," said Dimitrios Biller, who worked for Toyota from 2003 to 2007 defending against rollover accident lawsuits, in an interview Wednesday with ABC News.
Biller is suing Toyota, alleging that it withheld data in civil lawsuits and from the government, and is being countersued by the automaker.
In his first interview since filing his lawsuit last year, he said he learned of the electronics glitches while he was a lawyer for Toyota and said his evidence for that would still be considered privileged.
Toyota has said it has no evidence that cars' electronics are the cause of the problem that is the subject of complaints to safety regulators alleging accidents, deaths and injuries.
Its two recalls covering more than 5 million vehicles — one to deal with floor mats that jam under accelerators, the other to fix sticky gas pedals — will fix the problem, Toyota contends.
Last month, it stopped selling eight models until they could be repaired.
As for Biller's latest allegation, Toyota said Biller "did not handle unwanted-acceleration cases" and "continues to make inaccurate and misleading allegations about Toyota's conduct that we strongly dispute."
Biller's attorney, Joseph Wohrle, confirmed that Biller handled at least one unintended acceleration case for Toyota in 2005.
At the Chicago Auto Show media preview Wednesday, Toyota was blanketed with questions about its recalls, overshadowing its unveiling of a new version of its full-size Avalon sedan.
"I can tell you for years we have exhaustively tested these systems," said Bob Carter, the vice president in charge of the Toyota brand in the U.S. "There is simply nothing there to say electronic controls are causing the problems. ... We have exhaustively tested every scenario."
Lingering doubts about Toyota safety are turning away customers. A study by Kelley Blue Book finds 27% who were considering a Toyota for their next vehicle purchase before the latest recall say they are no longer interested. Doubts are extending, too, to Toyota's Scion youth-oriented brand and the Lexus luxury label.
Biller, who left Toyota with a $3.9 million settlement, alleges in federal court filings here that the automaker didn't properly disclose data in 300 rollover lawsuits.
Toyota has countersued, alleging that Biller is violating attorney-client privilege and terms of his settlement.
Contributing: Sharon Silke Carty in Chicago
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By Chris Woodyard, USA TODAY
LOS ANGELES — A former in-house lawyer for Toyota alleged Wednesday that the automaker's unintended acceleration issues are caused by electronics snafus in cars, not just floor-mat jams and sticky gas pedals.
"It's the electronic throttle control," said Dimitrios Biller, who worked for Toyota from 2003 to 2007 defending against rollover accident lawsuits, in an interview Wednesday with ABC News.
Biller is suing Toyota, alleging that it withheld data in civil lawsuits and from the government, and is being countersued by the automaker.
In his first interview since filing his lawsuit last year, he said he learned of the electronics glitches while he was a lawyer for Toyota and said his evidence for that would still be considered privileged.
Toyota has said it has no evidence that cars' electronics are the cause of the problem that is the subject of complaints to safety regulators alleging accidents, deaths and injuries.
Its two recalls covering more than 5 million vehicles — one to deal with floor mats that jam under accelerators, the other to fix sticky gas pedals — will fix the problem, Toyota contends.
Last month, it stopped selling eight models until they could be repaired.
As for Biller's latest allegation, Toyota said Biller "did not handle unwanted-acceleration cases" and "continues to make inaccurate and misleading allegations about Toyota's conduct that we strongly dispute."
Biller's attorney, Joseph Wohrle, confirmed that Biller handled at least one unintended acceleration case for Toyota in 2005.
At the Chicago Auto Show media preview Wednesday, Toyota was blanketed with questions about its recalls, overshadowing its unveiling of a new version of its full-size Avalon sedan.
"I can tell you for years we have exhaustively tested these systems," said Bob Carter, the vice president in charge of the Toyota brand in the U.S. "There is simply nothing there to say electronic controls are causing the problems. ... We have exhaustively tested every scenario."
Lingering doubts about Toyota safety are turning away customers. A study by Kelley Blue Book finds 27% who were considering a Toyota for their next vehicle purchase before the latest recall say they are no longer interested. Doubts are extending, too, to Toyota's Scion youth-oriented brand and the Lexus luxury label.
Biller, who left Toyota with a $3.9 million settlement, alleges in federal court filings here that the automaker didn't properly disclose data in 300 rollover lawsuits.
Toyota has countersued, alleging that Biller is violating attorney-client privilege and terms of his settlement.
Contributing: Sharon Silke Carty in Chicago
Behind the Troubles at Toyota
By Bill Saporito / Toyota City Thursday, Feb. 11, 2010
A row of 2010 Toyota Priuses at a dealership in Daly City, Calif.
Robert Galbraith / Reuters
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What's wrong with Toyota?
Not much. At least not from an engineering, mechanical or even a quality point of view. You don't reach the top gear in the global auto industry unless you make outstanding cars, which Toyota does — most of the time. Though cars are familiar machines, they are also highly complex ones. To create a modern car, a company has to design, engineer, build, buy and then assemble some 10,000 parts. Sell 7.8 million cars, as Toyota did worldwide in 2009 — a horrible year for the industry — and there are billions of new parts with the potential to go kerflooey. Inevitably, some do.
What makes the recall since November of nearly 9 million Toyotas that are susceptible to uncontrolled acceleration and balky brakes such a shocking story is not so much the company's manufacture of some shoddy cars or even its dreadful crisis management — though those are errors that will cost it more than $2 billion in repairs and lost sales this year. It's something more pernicious: the vapor lock that seems to have seized Toyota's mythologized corporate culture and turned one of the most admired companies in the world into a bunch of flailing gearheads. Not only is Toyota producing more flawed cars than in the past, but an organization known for its unrivaled ability to suss out problems, fix them and turn them into advantages is looking clueless on all counts.
(See the 50 worst cars of all time.)
Although the recalls seemed sudden, the evidence has been piling up. Literally. According to a report from Massachusetts-based Safety Research & Strategies (SRS), a consumer-advocacy group, there was a spike in the number of unintended-acceleration incidents in some Toyota vehicles in 2002, about the same time that Toyota introduced its electronic throttle control. The problem was initially blamed on a floor mat or vehicle trim that, if it came loose, could jam the accelerator pedal in an open-throttle position. That was followed by the first of several National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) investigations, in 2003, and two small recalls in 2005 and 2007. But accidents mounted, and last November the company had to take back nearly 3.8 million U.S. Vehicles — its biggest-ever recall — to address the problem.
Modifying the floor mats, though, didn't fix things. Toyota at first refused to believe that there was a mechanical problem with its pedals, blaming customers for improperly installing the floor mats. But by the time Toyota got around to a second recall, on Jan. 21, this one of 2.3 million vehicles, its reputation was in tatters.
(See the top 10 product recalls.)
There was no place left to park the blame. The company backhandedly singled out a U.S. Partsmaker — CTS Corp., of Elkhart, Ind. — as the supplier of defective pedals while exonerating a Japanese company, Denso, that makes the same part. But CTS CEO Vinod M. Khilnani wasn't about to take the fall. He says his company met Toyota's engineering specifications and notes that the recalls tied to unintended acceleration extend to vehicles built as long ago as 2002. "CTS didn't become a Toyota supplier until 2005," he says.
There was more to come. In early February, Toyota managed to back over any remaining political goodwill it had when it voluntarily recalled more than 400,000 Prius and other hybrid cars — this time, to update software in the antilock brake system that could cause a glitch if the car traveled over a bumpy surface. The Lexus is Toyota's top-selling luxury model — bad enough — but the Prius is its darling, a car that demonstrated the company's ability to solve technical issues that kept other automakers from fielding gas-electric hybrids, at the same time clinching Toyota's green cred. Only last month at the Detroit Auto Show, executives described the Prius as the cornerstone of Toyota's future growth. Toyota planned to sell a million hybrids a year globally, most of them in North America.
As Toyota dithered, it lost hold of the wheel. Lawyers and politicians took charge. In Washington, Toyota executives are poised to replace bankers as populist targets before a congressional hearing. "Toyota drivers have gone from being customers of the company to being wards of the government," says Jim Cain, senior vice president of Quell Group, a marketing-communications firm in Detroit, and a former Ford media-relations executive. "It's absolutely the worst possible position to be in." Tort lawyers around the U.S. have filed class actions. SRS says it has identified 2,262 instances of unintended acceleration in Toyotas leading to at least 819 crashes and 26 deaths since 1999.
At Toyota dealerships, meanwhile, customers have had to haul their cars in to have the sticky gas pedals repaired. Loyal Toyota owners now have a reason to flirt with other brands, though switching could cost them: trade-in prices for Toyotas have fallen. And at global headquarters in Toyota City, Japan, corporate officers belatedly grasped the seriousness of the situation and tried to make amends. "I apologize from the bottom of my heart for all the concern that we have given to so many of our customers," a chastened Akio Toyoda, grandson of the corporation's legendary founder, Sakichi Toyoda, told reporters in Nagoya, taking the requisite deep bow of the disgraced.
The Little Company That Could
So what happened? What went awry at the car company whose widely admired Toyota Production System (TPS) had made it the paragon of the art of manufacturing?
By Bill Saporito / Toyota City Thursday, Feb. 11, 2010
A row of 2010 Toyota Priuses at a dealership in Daly City, Calif.
Robert Galbraith / Reuters
Comment
Digg
MORE
35
Share
What's wrong with Toyota?
Not much. At least not from an engineering, mechanical or even a quality point of view. You don't reach the top gear in the global auto industry unless you make outstanding cars, which Toyota does — most of the time. Though cars are familiar machines, they are also highly complex ones. To create a modern car, a company has to design, engineer, build, buy and then assemble some 10,000 parts. Sell 7.8 million cars, as Toyota did worldwide in 2009 — a horrible year for the industry — and there are billions of new parts with the potential to go kerflooey. Inevitably, some do.
What makes the recall since November of nearly 9 million Toyotas that are susceptible to uncontrolled acceleration and balky brakes such a shocking story is not so much the company's manufacture of some shoddy cars or even its dreadful crisis management — though those are errors that will cost it more than $2 billion in repairs and lost sales this year. It's something more pernicious: the vapor lock that seems to have seized Toyota's mythologized corporate culture and turned one of the most admired companies in the world into a bunch of flailing gearheads. Not only is Toyota producing more flawed cars than in the past, but an organization known for its unrivaled ability to suss out problems, fix them and turn them into advantages is looking clueless on all counts.
(See the 50 worst cars of all time.)
Although the recalls seemed sudden, the evidence has been piling up. Literally. According to a report from Massachusetts-based Safety Research & Strategies (SRS), a consumer-advocacy group, there was a spike in the number of unintended-acceleration incidents in some Toyota vehicles in 2002, about the same time that Toyota introduced its electronic throttle control. The problem was initially blamed on a floor mat or vehicle trim that, if it came loose, could jam the accelerator pedal in an open-throttle position. That was followed by the first of several National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) investigations, in 2003, and two small recalls in 2005 and 2007. But accidents mounted, and last November the company had to take back nearly 3.8 million U.S. Vehicles — its biggest-ever recall — to address the problem.
Modifying the floor mats, though, didn't fix things. Toyota at first refused to believe that there was a mechanical problem with its pedals, blaming customers for improperly installing the floor mats. But by the time Toyota got around to a second recall, on Jan. 21, this one of 2.3 million vehicles, its reputation was in tatters.
(See the top 10 product recalls.)
There was no place left to park the blame. The company backhandedly singled out a U.S. Partsmaker — CTS Corp., of Elkhart, Ind. — as the supplier of defective pedals while exonerating a Japanese company, Denso, that makes the same part. But CTS CEO Vinod M. Khilnani wasn't about to take the fall. He says his company met Toyota's engineering specifications and notes that the recalls tied to unintended acceleration extend to vehicles built as long ago as 2002. "CTS didn't become a Toyota supplier until 2005," he says.
There was more to come. In early February, Toyota managed to back over any remaining political goodwill it had when it voluntarily recalled more than 400,000 Prius and other hybrid cars — this time, to update software in the antilock brake system that could cause a glitch if the car traveled over a bumpy surface. The Lexus is Toyota's top-selling luxury model — bad enough — but the Prius is its darling, a car that demonstrated the company's ability to solve technical issues that kept other automakers from fielding gas-electric hybrids, at the same time clinching Toyota's green cred. Only last month at the Detroit Auto Show, executives described the Prius as the cornerstone of Toyota's future growth. Toyota planned to sell a million hybrids a year globally, most of them in North America.
As Toyota dithered, it lost hold of the wheel. Lawyers and politicians took charge. In Washington, Toyota executives are poised to replace bankers as populist targets before a congressional hearing. "Toyota drivers have gone from being customers of the company to being wards of the government," says Jim Cain, senior vice president of Quell Group, a marketing-communications firm in Detroit, and a former Ford media-relations executive. "It's absolutely the worst possible position to be in." Tort lawyers around the U.S. have filed class actions. SRS says it has identified 2,262 instances of unintended acceleration in Toyotas leading to at least 819 crashes and 26 deaths since 1999.
At Toyota dealerships, meanwhile, customers have had to haul their cars in to have the sticky gas pedals repaired. Loyal Toyota owners now have a reason to flirt with other brands, though switching could cost them: trade-in prices for Toyotas have fallen. And at global headquarters in Toyota City, Japan, corporate officers belatedly grasped the seriousness of the situation and tried to make amends. "I apologize from the bottom of my heart for all the concern that we have given to so many of our customers," a chastened Akio Toyoda, grandson of the corporation's legendary founder, Sakichi Toyoda, told reporters in Nagoya, taking the requisite deep bow of the disgraced.
The Little Company That Could
So what happened? What went awry at the car company whose widely admired Toyota Production System (TPS) had made it the paragon of the art of manufacturing?
The reputation for quality that Toyota has damaged in just a few months took decades to build. Though Toyota was founded in the 1930s, its climb to global prominence started after World War II as the company became one of the exemplars of Japan's miracle — the creation of a successful, technologically advanced economy out of the ashes of war. In the 1950s, the company experimented with ways to manufacture cars more efficiently. Ironically, Japan's awful postwar poverty acted as a spur. The production techniques of American car companies — with heaps of stored components awaiting assembly, and ample machinery to do it — was just too wasteful and expensive for Japan. Toyota had to learn to do more with less. The result was TPS — or, more generically, lean manufacturing. Inventories were all but eliminated by employing just-in-time delivery techniques, in which suppliers brought components to the assembly line only when needed.
One organizing philosophy behind TPS is popularly ascribed to a concept called kaizen — Japanese for "continuous improvement." In practice, it's the idea of empowering those people closest to a work process so they can participate in designing and improving it, rather than, say, spending every shift merely whacking four bolts to secure the front seat as each car moves down the line. Continuous improvement constantly squeezes excess labor and material out of the manufacturing process: people and parts meet at the optimal moment. Kaizen is also about spreading what you've learned throughout the system. And then repeating it. It's the reason, for instance, that when Toyota assumed full control of the New United Motor Manufacturing plant in Fremont, Calif., which it had co-owned with GM, it got way more productivity and quality out of it than GM could with essentially the same workforce and equipment.
(See the most exciting cars of 2010.)
Sakichi Toyoda developed another concept, jidoka, or "automation with a human touch." Think of it as built-in stress detection. At Toyota, that means work stops whenever and wherever a problem occurs. (Any employee can pull a cord to shut down the line if there is a problem.) That way, says Steven Spear of MIT, author of Chasing the Rabbit: How Market Leaders Outdistance the Competition and an expert in the dynamics of high-performance companies, "When I see something that's not perfect, I call it out, figure out what it is that I don't know and convert ignorance to knowledge."
(Comment on this story below)
That was the idea. But the fact that Toyota has produced so many imperfect cars is evidence that its system developed faults. Management experts like John Paul MacDuffie, a co-director of the International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP) at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School, place the blame on the company's headlong growth in the past 10 years. In 2000, Toyota produced 5.2 million cars; last year it had the capacity to make 10 million. Since 2000, when Toyota had 58 production sites, it has added 17. In that time, in other words, Toyota has added the capacity of a company virtually the size of Chrysler in a stated ambition to become the world's No. 1 auto company.
(See pictures of Japanese design's greatest hits.)
But rapid expansion puts enormous pressure on any company's ability to transmit know-how and technology, especially over long distances and across national cultures. When Toyota opened its Georgetown, Ky., plant in 1988, hundreds of work-team specialists and other experts were transplanted from Japan for several years to make sure the new plant fully absorbed the Toyota way. That kind of hand-holding may still be possible, but it isn't as easy. How can that be fixed? Says Spear: "The big deal is this question, Does an organization know how to hear and respond to weak signals, which are the problems, or does it have to hear strong signals? You have to listen to weak signals. By the time you get to strong signals, it's too late."
When weak signals started coming out in 2002, Toyota's top management wasn't listening. By then, the heroic stage of Japan Inc. was over; parts of its business culture had become sclerotic. Compared with the nimbleness seen in Silicon Valley, Japan's manufacturers and their systems began to be seen as inflexible, too removed from a changing global economy to adapt. Analysts describe a Toyota management team that had fallen in love with itself and become too insular to properly handle something like the current crisis. "The reaction to [the situation] is a very Japanese thing," says Kenneth Grossberg, a marketing professor at Waseda University's business school in Tokyo. Jeffrey Kingston, director of Asian studies at Temple University Japan, says Toyota's managers don't understand how sensitive the American public is to auto-safety issues. "Their focus on the customer has been nonexistent," he says. "Toyota is famous for having an arrogant culture. They're so used to dealing with successes that when they have a problem, they're not sure how to respond."
Kingston puts his finger on one failing in modern Japanese corporations like Toyota: those lower in the organization find it difficult to deliver bad news to managers. Nearly every company faces this issue from time to time. "But this is a brand-threatening, life-endangering crisis," he says. Changing the way Toyota works won't be easy, says Grossberg. "Management cannot turn on a dime. They have so much invested in doing things the Toyota way," he says.
How to Lose Influential Friends
The recalls came at time when Toyota was regaining momentum after losing $4.9 billion in its latest fiscal year, as recession-racked consumers parked their money. For much of the past year, hundreds of Toyota employees in the U.S. didn't build cars at all, instead attending classes or doing "maintenance" work on half-built vehicles at idled factories in Texas and Indiana. Toyota kept the workers on in anticipation of better times ahead. Now the company is looking at another year of losses and significant overcapacity in North America.
One organizing philosophy behind TPS is popularly ascribed to a concept called kaizen — Japanese for "continuous improvement." In practice, it's the idea of empowering those people closest to a work process so they can participate in designing and improving it, rather than, say, spending every shift merely whacking four bolts to secure the front seat as each car moves down the line. Continuous improvement constantly squeezes excess labor and material out of the manufacturing process: people and parts meet at the optimal moment. Kaizen is also about spreading what you've learned throughout the system. And then repeating it. It's the reason, for instance, that when Toyota assumed full control of the New United Motor Manufacturing plant in Fremont, Calif., which it had co-owned with GM, it got way more productivity and quality out of it than GM could with essentially the same workforce and equipment.
(See the most exciting cars of 2010.)
Sakichi Toyoda developed another concept, jidoka, or "automation with a human touch." Think of it as built-in stress detection. At Toyota, that means work stops whenever and wherever a problem occurs. (Any employee can pull a cord to shut down the line if there is a problem.) That way, says Steven Spear of MIT, author of Chasing the Rabbit: How Market Leaders Outdistance the Competition and an expert in the dynamics of high-performance companies, "When I see something that's not perfect, I call it out, figure out what it is that I don't know and convert ignorance to knowledge."
(Comment on this story below)
That was the idea. But the fact that Toyota has produced so many imperfect cars is evidence that its system developed faults. Management experts like John Paul MacDuffie, a co-director of the International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP) at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School, place the blame on the company's headlong growth in the past 10 years. In 2000, Toyota produced 5.2 million cars; last year it had the capacity to make 10 million. Since 2000, when Toyota had 58 production sites, it has added 17. In that time, in other words, Toyota has added the capacity of a company virtually the size of Chrysler in a stated ambition to become the world's No. 1 auto company.
(See pictures of Japanese design's greatest hits.)
But rapid expansion puts enormous pressure on any company's ability to transmit know-how and technology, especially over long distances and across national cultures. When Toyota opened its Georgetown, Ky., plant in 1988, hundreds of work-team specialists and other experts were transplanted from Japan for several years to make sure the new plant fully absorbed the Toyota way. That kind of hand-holding may still be possible, but it isn't as easy. How can that be fixed? Says Spear: "The big deal is this question, Does an organization know how to hear and respond to weak signals, which are the problems, or does it have to hear strong signals? You have to listen to weak signals. By the time you get to strong signals, it's too late."
When weak signals started coming out in 2002, Toyota's top management wasn't listening. By then, the heroic stage of Japan Inc. was over; parts of its business culture had become sclerotic. Compared with the nimbleness seen in Silicon Valley, Japan's manufacturers and their systems began to be seen as inflexible, too removed from a changing global economy to adapt. Analysts describe a Toyota management team that had fallen in love with itself and become too insular to properly handle something like the current crisis. "The reaction to [the situation] is a very Japanese thing," says Kenneth Grossberg, a marketing professor at Waseda University's business school in Tokyo. Jeffrey Kingston, director of Asian studies at Temple University Japan, says Toyota's managers don't understand how sensitive the American public is to auto-safety issues. "Their focus on the customer has been nonexistent," he says. "Toyota is famous for having an arrogant culture. They're so used to dealing with successes that when they have a problem, they're not sure how to respond."
Kingston puts his finger on one failing in modern Japanese corporations like Toyota: those lower in the organization find it difficult to deliver bad news to managers. Nearly every company faces this issue from time to time. "But this is a brand-threatening, life-endangering crisis," he says. Changing the way Toyota works won't be easy, says Grossberg. "Management cannot turn on a dime. They have so much invested in doing things the Toyota way," he says.
How to Lose Influential Friends
The recalls came at time when Toyota was regaining momentum after losing $4.9 billion in its latest fiscal year, as recession-racked consumers parked their money. For much of the past year, hundreds of Toyota employees in the U.S. didn't build cars at all, instead attending classes or doing "maintenance" work on half-built vehicles at idled factories in Texas and Indiana. Toyota kept the workers on in anticipation of better times ahead. Now the company is looking at another year of losses and significant overcapacity in North America.
On top of criticism that it has been slow to fix its vehicles, Toyota has wrecked its political cover. Although the company had artfully balanced both U.S. political parties by designing green cars and building them in red states, its goodwill was strained in recent weeks by the decision to close its manufacturing plant in Fremont, just across the bay from Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's home base in San Francisco. The shutdown of the plant in March will wipe out 5,400 jobs and hit hard the more than 1,000 suppliers that work with the factory. "I think they offended the Democratic delegation in California," says Sean McAlinden, executive vice president of research at the Center for Automotive Research in Ann Arbor, Mich. The fact that Toyota had to deny persistent reports it was planning to move its U.S. headquarters out of Southern California didn't help. Then came the airing of a horrifying 911 call from a passenger in a Lexus ES 350 in California with a jammed accelerator. Four people were killed in the ensuing crash. "No politician is going to stand up and defend Toyota after that," says Jesse Toprak, vice president of industry trends and insights at TrueCar.
The NHTSA, part of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), did Toyota no favors either. Although there have been some rumblings that the DOT was coming down too hard on the top competitor of the federally controlled General Motors — a.k.a. Government Motors — the agency actually fumbled no fewer than six separate inquiries into possible safety problems with Toyotas since 2003. In each case, the DOT ended the probes with little or no further action. That changed as the tragic evidence mounted. And when Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood blurted out advice to Toyota owners to avoid driving their cars — advice he hastily withdrew — he more or less forced the issue.
(See the best cars from the 2009 Detroit Auto Show.)
In Detroit, which has had its own problems with quality, there is no outright rejoicing over Toyota's troubles. But there is a sense of an opening to win some business, and a certain pleasure in seeing the spotlight of criticism focus on a foreign carmaker. "There was always this assumption in the mainstream media that Toyota was better," says a senior GM executive. "Hopefully this will help even things out a little bit. Maybe from now on, Toyota will be treated as just another car company."
That, it certainly isn't. Toyota is still an extraordinary outfit, one likely to set the pace in the automotive industry for years. But it can't do so without addressing its shortfalls. Complexity is the enemy of any manufacturer, and rapid growth increases it. "Toyota faced excessive or overwhelming complexity that even its strong capability could not handle adequately," notes University of Tokyo professor Takahiro Fujimoto, who is affiliated with the Wharton School's IMVP.
(Read "Toyota's Recall Will Test Customer Loyalty.")
Toyota's bosses are desperately hoping the worst is behind it. The company has resumed production at five factories in North America after shutting down sales of eight key models to repair the sticky accelerator pedals. Dealers will be able to sell existing inventory once the pedals are repaired, says Jim Lentz, Toyota's top U.S. sales executive. The faulty pedal has been redesigned, and new models coming off the assembly lines are getting new pedal assemblies.
The company has also been trying to repair its relationship with consumers. "We have not lived up to the high standards you have come to expect from us. I am deeply disappointed by that and apologize. As the president of Toyota, I take personal responsibility," Akio Toyoda wrote in the Washington Post.
Lentz, who defended Toyota recently at the Detroit Auto Show, said that while the recall is embarrassing, "it doesn't necessarily mean we've lost our edge on quality." It's way too early, he insists, to tell what kind of impact the multiple recalls will have on Toyota's sales.
It's not too early to say that consumers have not seen the last of massive, worldwide recalls of cars — in part because car companies have adopted the Toyota approach. Ford's new and highly praised strategy is to build "world cars" the way Toyota does, reducing the cost of manufacturing by making sure that more of its models share common parts on a relatively small number of platforms, built at plants around the world. That sounds like the epitome of manufacturing efficiency in our globalized economies. But it also explains why the brakes that caused the Prius' recall are found on Toyota's luxury Lexus 300 too. It's a system that all but guarantees that there are no small problems when a part goes bad, only big ones. In fact, global ones.
There's no sense in reinventing the wheel — going back to an industry in which every car demands a factory full of specific parts. But as the world's most famous automobile company has just demonstrated, if you're in the business of making cars, you'd better make sure your wheel works.
— With reporting by Alex Altman / Washington
The NHTSA, part of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), did Toyota no favors either. Although there have been some rumblings that the DOT was coming down too hard on the top competitor of the federally controlled General Motors — a.k.a. Government Motors — the agency actually fumbled no fewer than six separate inquiries into possible safety problems with Toyotas since 2003. In each case, the DOT ended the probes with little or no further action. That changed as the tragic evidence mounted. And when Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood blurted out advice to Toyota owners to avoid driving their cars — advice he hastily withdrew — he more or less forced the issue.
(See the best cars from the 2009 Detroit Auto Show.)
In Detroit, which has had its own problems with quality, there is no outright rejoicing over Toyota's troubles. But there is a sense of an opening to win some business, and a certain pleasure in seeing the spotlight of criticism focus on a foreign carmaker. "There was always this assumption in the mainstream media that Toyota was better," says a senior GM executive. "Hopefully this will help even things out a little bit. Maybe from now on, Toyota will be treated as just another car company."
That, it certainly isn't. Toyota is still an extraordinary outfit, one likely to set the pace in the automotive industry for years. But it can't do so without addressing its shortfalls. Complexity is the enemy of any manufacturer, and rapid growth increases it. "Toyota faced excessive or overwhelming complexity that even its strong capability could not handle adequately," notes University of Tokyo professor Takahiro Fujimoto, who is affiliated with the Wharton School's IMVP.
(Read "Toyota's Recall Will Test Customer Loyalty.")
Toyota's bosses are desperately hoping the worst is behind it. The company has resumed production at five factories in North America after shutting down sales of eight key models to repair the sticky accelerator pedals. Dealers will be able to sell existing inventory once the pedals are repaired, says Jim Lentz, Toyota's top U.S. sales executive. The faulty pedal has been redesigned, and new models coming off the assembly lines are getting new pedal assemblies.
The company has also been trying to repair its relationship with consumers. "We have not lived up to the high standards you have come to expect from us. I am deeply disappointed by that and apologize. As the president of Toyota, I take personal responsibility," Akio Toyoda wrote in the Washington Post.
Lentz, who defended Toyota recently at the Detroit Auto Show, said that while the recall is embarrassing, "it doesn't necessarily mean we've lost our edge on quality." It's way too early, he insists, to tell what kind of impact the multiple recalls will have on Toyota's sales.
It's not too early to say that consumers have not seen the last of massive, worldwide recalls of cars — in part because car companies have adopted the Toyota approach. Ford's new and highly praised strategy is to build "world cars" the way Toyota does, reducing the cost of manufacturing by making sure that more of its models share common parts on a relatively small number of platforms, built at plants around the world. That sounds like the epitome of manufacturing efficiency in our globalized economies. But it also explains why the brakes that caused the Prius' recall are found on Toyota's luxury Lexus 300 too. It's a system that all but guarantees that there are no small problems when a part goes bad, only big ones. In fact, global ones.
There's no sense in reinventing the wheel — going back to an industry in which every car demands a factory full of specific parts. But as the world's most famous automobile company has just demonstrated, if you're in the business of making cars, you'd better make sure your wheel works.
— With reporting by Alex Altman / Washington
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